

Russian-Ukrainian war: The new security strategy for European countries

الحرب الروسية الأوكرانية: الاستراتيجية الأمنية الجديدة للدول الأوروبية

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Abstract:

Russia's war in Ukraine ignited the most serious security crisis in Europe since the end of World War II, and prompted the continent to make unprecedented decisions on security, defense and EU enlargement under the pressure of a new reality and fear of death and destruction, even an all-out nuclear war and the rollback of Western military and political hegemony. The importance of this context is reinforced by the restoration of the Atlantic promises to the Russians at the beginning of the nineties of the last century, when the first batches of including Eastern countries in the alliance were launched, and the assurances of NATO leaders that Russia would not be encircled. After that, Russia felt the West's pulse regarding the possibility of joining itself, and then participated in the "Partnership for Peace" program, and was subsequently ignored, without ignoring the other eastern countries that were included in four batches. However, while neither Russia nor NATO wants war with the other side, both of them used rhetoric to escalate tensions, so could Ukraine be a starting point for more security changes on the continent?

Key words: The Russian-Ukrainian war, NATO, European security, The militarization of international relations.

المستخلص:

أشعلت حرب روسيا في أوكرانيا أخطر أزمة أمنية في أوروبا منذ نهاية الحرب العالمية الثانية، ودفعت القارة إلى اتخاذ قرارات غير مسبقة بشأن الأمن والدفاع وتوسيع الاتحاد الأوروبي تحت ضغط الواقع الجديد والخوف من الموت والدمار، بل وحرب نووية شاملة ودحر الهيمنة الغربية العسكرية والسياسية. تتعزز أهمية هذا السياق من خلال استرجاع الوعود الأطلنطية للروس في بداية التسعينيات من القرن الماضي، حين انطلقت أولى دفعات ضم الدول الشرقية إلى الحلف، وتأكيد قادة الناتو أنه لن يتم تطويق روسيا. بعد ذلك اردات روسيا استشعار موافقه الغرب بشأن إمكان انضمامها هي نفسها، ثم شاركت في برنامج "الشراكة من أجل السلام"،

وتم تجاهلها بعد ذلك، من دون أن يتم تجاهل الدول الشرقية الأخرى التي ضُمت على أربع دفعات. لكن، بينما لا تريد روسيا ولا حلف "الناتو" الحرب مع الطرف الآخر، فإن كلاهما استخدم خطاباً لتصعيد التوترات، فهل يمكن أن تكون أوكرانيا نقطة انطلاق لمزيد من المتغيرات الأمنية في القارة؟

الكلمات المفتاحية: الحرب الروسية الأوكرانية , حلف الناتو, الأمن الأوروبي, عسكره العلاقات الدولية.

Introduction

Since Russia mobilized its military forces on the border with Ukraine in October 2021, and then its military intervention in Ukrainian territory on the morning of Thursday, February 24, 2022; The United States of America is facing a complex international crisis, one of the most difficult since the end of the Cold War. Over the course of the last five months of the crisis period (October 2021 to February 2022), the administration of President Joe Biden set a set of strategic goals to protect American interests and national security from the repercussions of that crisis, and took a number of steps to respond to them. However, with the acceleration and severity of the crisis in Russia and Ukraine, and the continued stability of Moscow's position and determination to implement its goals, it became clear that there is a gap between the American goals and the Biden administration's response to the crisis, and this gap reflects a strategic impasse for Washington whose repercussions will appear later¹

After Russia launched the war, European countries moved with unprecedented determination and unity in the field of defense. Their governments began to increase military spending, strengthen preparations, and send units to protect the eastern borders of NATO, while Paris and Berlin pushed towards the creation of a European army that would allow member states to pool their national forces. and overcoming their ineffective capabilities, given that a common European Union defense would protect Europe if the Americans elect an isolationist president, instead of the current US pro-NATO administration.

Politicians and critics agree that the trauma of the war in Ukraine could turn the European Union into an important military player on the global map. This sparked a joint response from the European Union countries, which have become more cohesive and are now looking at how to build a more solid and credible European defense as the only possible response to this crisis².

The assessments of observers and those interested in the security and defense policies of the European Union differ on how the Russian war in Ukraine, which began since February 2022, affects European security arrangements, while others argue that this war is pushing the Europeans to develop a purely European security system that is independent of NATO and is not influenced by American policies.

Adopting either of these views involves a measure of analytical risk; For two main reasons: The first reason relates to the fact that there is a European security arrangement, or as some call it a “European security system” that is mainly associated with the European Union, and it has developed over decades, and it consists of a specific perception of threats and risks, common security interests of the countries of the Union, and strategic documents that The security and political institutions of the Union shall implement them in order to achieve the internal and external security of European countries³.

The second reason relates to the existence of a clear divergence in the security perceptions of the European Union from those of NATO and the priorities of threats and ways to confront them, which provides strong justifications for the European Union to enhance its security and defense capabilities independently of NATO to move in line with its security perceptions, without this implying the withdrawal of states Europe from NATO.

In this context, it can be said that the Russian military intervention in Ukraine may be an important variable that may push the Europeans to make a qualitative shift in European security arrangements, whether with regard to threats and risks or the common security interests that the Union seeks to achieve at the level of internal security. That is, with regard to the security of the European citizen, or at the level of the external security of the Union through partnership with neighboring countries.

Whereas the Russian war brought about fundamental changes in the European security environment; On the one hand, it returned conventional warfare to European security calculations, which had been declining in importance over the past years in favor of non-conventional security threats. On the other hand, this war confirmed that Russia is still and will remain an influential party in the European balance of power directly in view of its military arsenal, and indirectly through its military support for certain countries in Eastern Europe, as long as it is not integrated into

any European security arrangement sponsored by the United States or not European countries seek to establish it independently within the framework of the European Union⁴.

In light of these changes, discussing the dimensions of the impact of this war on European security arrangements and its future may lead to possible results about the balance of power in this part of the world, which greatly affects the security, political and economic interactions in the southern Mediterranean and the Middle East. In this context, this paper is mainly concerned with the security arrangements of the European Union, which are different from those of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and those of NATO.

First: The beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian crisis:

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the attention of countries has turned towards the West, including Russia, in the hope of achieving the success that the socialist experiment failed to achieve. However, the successes achieved for Russia, especially after President Vladimir Putin took power in Russia in 2000, after the sudden resignation of Boris Yeltsin, and the arrival of Putin to power, which revived hope for Russia to return to its former position as an important international pole, and the desire In creating regional and international blocs, while preserving their old alliances for those they could consider as supportive allies in the face of the ambitions of Western expansion, which threatens their areas of influence, while the desire to join the European Union continued among its partners in the former Soviet Union, including Ukraine, a situation that led to the emergence of intersections between The Russian-Ukrainian parties, and the crisis aggravated despite the existence of a history of common events between them along with the strategic political and economic interests. The former Soviet Union stage represented an area for cultural and social fusion in addition to the political and economic, as Ukraine became the center of the conflict between East and West⁵.

The beginning of the first major diplomatic crisis between Moscow and Kiev during the era of "Vladimir Putin", in the fall of 2003; As Russia suddenly started building a dam in the Kerch Strait towards the Ukrainian island of Kosa Tusla, which Kyiv considered an attempt to redraw a new border between the two countries, which

intensified the conflict, while this crisis was resolved after the bilateral meeting that brought together the two presidents. Russian and Ukrainian⁶ .

During the Ukrainian elections held in 2004, Russia supported the presidential candidate close to it, "Victor Yanukovich", but the "Orange Revolution" prevented his victory, and the presidential candidate "Victor Yushchenko" succeeded in reaching the seat of power in Kyiv, who is known for his orientation towards the West⁷, and during his presidency, Russia cut off gas supplies to the country twice, in 2006 and 2009. It also stopped gas supplies to the European Union⁸.

It is worth noting that the former US President "George W. Bush" supported at the 2008 NATO summit in the Romanian capital Bucharest, the idea of Ukraine joining NATO, in addition to the fact that a number of the most prominent NATO member states such as Canada and Poland supported the full right to include Ukraine and Georgia in the alliance. According to NATO's open-door approach, the move was opposed by Russian President Putin, whose government did not fully accept Ukraine's independence, while some reports said Germany and France thwarted Bush's plan for fear that support for Ukraine's membership would disrupt relations with Russia⁹.

The crisis escalated in February 2013 when the pro-Russian President of Ukraine at the time, Viktor Yanukovich, suspended preparations for the implementation of the Association Agreement with the European Union, and this suspension was followed by large-scale demonstrations and protests, and clashes between separatist organizations and Ukrainian government forces, in the Ukrainian capital¹⁰

With the intensification of protests from opponents of the president's decision, and turning into a major revolution that led to the removal of the president on February 22, 2014 by Parliament¹¹, and the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Alexander Turchinov was appointed in his place, and as a result Russia took control of the Crimea in 2014 in one of the The largest annexation of territories that Europe has experienced since the Second World War, one of the autonomous regions, and as a result of the situation, ceasefire agreements were imposed, which Ukraine considered unsuitable, and a war broke out in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts between pro-Russian separatists and the Ukrainian government.

After that, an agreement emerged called “Minsk Protocol”¹² in reference to the city in which it was negotiated, which aims to stop the conflict in Ukraine and includes the Ukrainian legalization of war-torn lands within the framework of the political system of Ukraine, after the ceasefire between the two parties. The withdrawal of heavy weapons, the issuance of a mutual amnesty, and the return of border controls to the authorities of Ukraine, and this means, from Ukraine's point of view, a loss of balance within Ukraine, because the territories controlled by Russia will impose a strong and deterrent influence on the internal policy of the country, and therefore Ukraine seeks to amend¹³.

Second: The Ukrainian crisis and the militarization of international relations:

To the extent that the Russian military intervention in Ukraine constitutes a historical turning point in strategic thought and military policies, the signs of an international order different from the one that is about to turn the pages of its geopolitical process loom on the global horizon.

America, after preaching a new world order in which the free world is lined up behind the American leadership, President Biden went to Brussels to participate in three summits of NATO, the Group of Seven, and the European Union. Praying from the three of them to confirm Western solidarity in the face of Russia, which is trying to invade Ukraine, change the balance of power in the old continent, and put an end to the American unipolar system. Through the "joint determination" strategy, Biden emphasized the solidity of the Western alliance in the great battle waged by democratic forces against authoritarianism. In an effort to drain Russia's comprehensive power, Washington set out to rein in Moscow and Beijing's rapprochement, restore the warmth of the Euro-Atlantic alliance, and end Russian hegemony over European energy security within five years. Simultaneously, the Biden administration intended to supply Ukraine with secret Soviet and Western weapons systems, with the intensification of the US military presence in Eastern Europe, and the exploitation of the Ukrainian crisis to double US arms sales and energy to allies. In response to the escalation of tension between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, Washington launched joint military exercises with the Philippines for two weeks, in order to deter Beijing¹⁴.

In Europe, the American insistence on supporting Ukraine with easy-to-use Soviet weapon systems provided an opportunity for eastern and central Atlantic countries to replace and renew their aging arsenal of fighters and Soviet air defense systems. In parallel, the Russian invasion of Ukraine led to the abortion of geopolitical cooperation with Moscow within the transatlantic partnership. After recognizing its military unpreparedness to deal with security threats and challenges, the European Union adopted a new sustainable defense and security strategy, formulated in the “Strategic Compass” document, to strengthen its security and defense policies by 2030. It was agreed to establish a “rapid deployment force” and conduct live exercises and regular on land and at sea, improve capabilities to counter cyber-attacks, hybrid threats and misinformation, and formulate a space security strategy.

During its recent extraordinary summit in Brussels, NATO considered the Russian invasion of Ukraine the most serious threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades. Hence, he decided to reinforce the security of his eastern flank, by deterring Russia with eight multinational battle groups along the eastern side from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. In response to Warsaw’s call to double European defense spending, in anticipation of any Russian attack on Poland, Finland, or the Baltic states, 23 European countries that combine NATO and EU membership announced that they would raise their defense spending from 1.5 percent of their gross domestic product, equivalent to \$200 billion annually to 2% in 2024. This will allow it to develop weapons and algorithms for electronic systems, and raise the balances of electronic defense against drones, space espionage and cyber warfare¹⁵.

Following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, a report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute monitored a huge growth in European arms imports. After it achieved a world record by increasing its purchases of arms by 19%, the share of the old continent in the international arms trade exchange, which exceeds a hundred billion dollars annually, jumped from 10 to 13%. The crisis of confidence between Russia and most European countries contributed to the exacerbation of US arms sales to Europe. During 2020 and 2021, the European rush to acquire American F-35 fighters increased. As a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the government of German Chancellor Schulz abandoned the approach of its predecessor, in terms of balancing security considerations with commercial interests. In order to deter Putin’s ambitions, Schultz delinquents, to restructure the

German army and provide it with the latest armament systems, by investing 5.2% of GDP in armaments, an increase of 0.9%, equivalent to 20 billion euros, so that 100 billion euros will be directed to defense spending with a budget 2022. The growth of that European militarism would cast a cloud over the balance of power between Europe and Russia, which is no longer a geopolitical partner of the West¹⁶.

After decades of strategic neutrality in the face of global tensions, countries such as Sweden, Finland, Austria, Switzerland, and Ireland adopted a position against Russia's military intervention in Ukraine, which they saw as a threat to the security of all of Europe. In support of the Ukrainian position, it closed its airspace to Russian aircraft, and imposed sanctions on Moscow. In an unprecedented development since 1939, Sweden provided qualitative military aid to Ukraine. Contrary to the policy it has followed since the fifties of the last century, regarding not sending weapons to non-NATO countries, Norway decided to provide Ukraine with advanced weapon systems¹⁷.

Aspiring to heal the rift in its relations with the European Union, after the Swiss Federal Council refused in 2021 to adopt the agreement regulating relations with Brussels, Switzerland allocated military extensions to Ukraine and imposed sanctions on Moscow. Stemming from the fears arising from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, neutral countries such as Sweden, Finland and Austria began submitting their papers to join NATO, which they participated in its major war games in northern Norway last month. In a precedent, the first in the history of the European Union, whose charters and treaties prohibit directing its funds to military projects, or supplying arms to countries from outside it, the Europeans pre-empted the last three Brussels summits by providing Ukraine with more than one billion dollars in military aid¹⁸.

As for Asia, Beijing has turned a blind eye to the thesis of the most famous Chinese strategic thinker, Sun Tzu, regarding controlling the enemy without fighting the most brilliant achievement of a military leader. On the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Chinese government raised its military budget by 7.1 percent, and an increase of 6.8 percent over last year, to touch \$230 billion, and it became the highest since 2019, and ranked second in the world after its American counterpart, which amounted to 740 Billion dollar. Thus, the growth of China's military spending exceeds the growth of domestic product, which is 5.5 percent for this year. As fears

exacerbated that Beijing was inspired by the Russian scenario regarding Ukraine, to invade Taiwan amphibiously and annex it to China by force, the American circles demanded to intensify the qualitative American military support for Taiwan, while raising the level of qualification of its forces¹⁹.

No sooner had North Korea warned the worlds of the possibility of abandoning the self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and intercontinental missile tests, until it rushed, for the first time since 2017, to exploit the war in Ukraine, to conduct thirteen tests to test its latest and most powerful hypersonic missiles, as well as those transiting ballistic missiles. For continents, full ranges. It is an escalating step, which the North Korean president considered a review of his country's nuclear capabilities, and a deterrence from any possible aggressive US military moves. However, the South Korean response came quickly, by launching several strategic and tactical ballistic missiles, to demonstrate the ability to launch a precise strike, if necessary, against North Korean missile launch sites and their command systems²⁰.

Against the background of Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, Japan imposed symbolic sanctions on Moscow, and also began to reinterpret Article 9 of its constitution, after it deprived it of the right to maintain armed forces with combat capabilities. In September 2015, the Japanese parliament enacted a series of laws that allow strengthening the country's military capabilities and enabling the Self-Defense Forces to support allies engaged in combat operations around the world. In the wake of the current Russian invasion of Ukraine, Japanese fears of Moscow's ambitions have grown, whose planes and warships have been penetrating its air and sea areas. Second World. Accordingly, Tokyo has reformulated its national security strategy, classifying Russia as a "security challenge." As a result of mounting concern about Putin's expansionist tendencies, Tokyo declared its solidarity with Washington to contain it, and thus froze the assets of the Russian Central Bank. In a very dangerous aspect, former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called for a review of the three Japanese nuclear no's, which are: not to possess, manufacture or introduce nuclear weapons into Japanese territory²¹.

The militarization of international interactions, under the weight of the Russian military operation in Ukraine, can fuel arms races and undermine diplomatic approaches to conflict resolution and crisis resolution. What threatens to exceed the military confrontations the borders of the Ukrainian field. May the human suffering

continue, between the catastrophic repercussions of the outbreak of World War III, and the tragic consequences of the resurgence of threats to use weapons of mass destruction²².

Third: The repercussions of the Ukrainian crisis and the Russian escalation in the absence of a European position

Perhaps the absence of a unified European position with the decline of the Western role in dealing with the crisis of the Russian escalation towards Ukraine, which stems mainly from the growing imbalance in the transatlantic balance of power, which resulted from Washington's efforts to consolidate its global hegemony and power in isolation from its allies, which led to a large gap. The balance of power is in favor of the United States of America compared to its European allies. The recent decline in US involvement in global issues in favor of focusing on confronting the Chinese rise, as well as the escalation of political crises and internal polarization in Washington is another factor that has undermined the chances of forming a strong Western alliance²³.

With regard to the shift in the balance of power in favor of Washington, this shift has been clearly visible since 2008 in the elements of comprehensive power; The United States' gross domestic product has significantly outpaced the European Union and the United Kingdom; As in 2020, the US economy grew to about \$20.9 trillion, while the European economy declined to about \$15.7 trillion, at a time when Washington is exploiting its global hegemony to gain a wide ability to impose financial sanctions on its enemies and allies alike. In the presence of clear European deference. The growing dominance of the United States in the technological field compared to the European role; As major American technology companies (Google - Amazon - Apple - Meta - Microsoft) came close to dominating the technological scene in Europe, in conjunction with the absence of European ability to develop local alternatives²⁴.

In terms of military power, European military spending has declined compared to US military spending. From 2008 to 2020, US military spending increased from \$656 billion to \$778 billion, coinciding with the decline in military spending of the European Union and the United Kingdom from \$303 billion to \$292 billion, at a time when Europe is witnessing more chronic divisions, which have led to the weakening

of the European Union, especially with Britain's exit from the Union, which has undermined its ability to formulate a common foreign policy, and harness its potential economic power, especially with the escalation of divisions. Related to the financial crisis between the countries of the North and the South, the migration crisis, as well as the Ukrainian crisis between the countries of East, West and Europe²⁵.

The absence of a strong European role in the Russian-Ukrainian crisis may be a reflection of the increasing dependence of European countries on the United States more than ever, especially with the escalation of geopolitical competition in the world, with other obstacles that may prevent reaching a strong Western alliance in the face of the Russian crisis. The Ukrainian, on top of which is the decline in Washington's involvement in international crises, in favor of focusing on confronting the growing Chinese influence, as well as the increase in internal polarization in Washington, which led to the creation of fluctuations in US foreign policy, and the emergence of anti-NATO trends, which call The necessity of Washington's foreign policy to adopt the slogan "America First," and with the increasing dependence of Europe on the United States, which may lead to a possible large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, in light of the inability of European countries to play an effective and decisive role in the Ukrainian crisis during the coming period, He emphasized that any solution or escalation of the crisis would come as a result of the talks between Washington and Moscow²⁶.

Fourth: The future of European security and NATO according to the Ukrainian crisis

With regard to the repercussions of the Russian escalation of the crisis on the future of NATO, the Russian invasion of Kiev may lead to the undermining of the current world order; Russia views the current conditions as being ripe for consolidating its control and restoring the glories of the Soviet Union; Putin sees that the United States is now under the administration of "Joe Biden" in a state of weakness and division, and lacks a coherent foreign policy, and the new German government led by "Olav Schulz" is still crystallizing the features of its policy, in addition to Europe's focus on its internal challenges. Putin is also trying to get China's support by forming partnerships with it. All this makes an opportunity for Moscow to regain its influence²⁷.

Putin's doctrine is also centered on making Russia - like the Soviet Union - a power respected by the West, noting that President Putin wants to divide the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as renegotiate the geographical settlement that ended the Cold War. Although it is still uncertain whether or not Putin will decide to invade, there is no doubt that Moscow will be more dangerous in the coming years; This is because Moscow's growing capabilities to threaten its neighbors are forcing the West to the negotiating table²⁸.

While President Putin views the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century, he has always talked about Russian grievances, especially the secession of Ukraine, and fears the deployment of NATO forces near his country's borders; Since the latter has been repeatedly invaded by the West. Thus, Putin relies on the media to export Russian grievances, and to highlight that Ukraine has become a threat to Russian security. It is - according to his claims - as a starting point for the West against Russia, especially after Russia today has become a nuclear power not to be underestimated. Thus, the possibility of a Western invasion of its lands is less. In contrast to "Putin's" account of the Russian grievances that his country was subjected to by the West, there is another opposing narrative that asserts that it is the neighboring countries that are always subjected to Russian invasion²⁹.

Perhaps the biggest gain that Russia can get from escalation against Ukraine is to undermine the transatlantic alliance; So, it supported anti-American groups in Europe, as well as skeptics of alliance with European countries in the United States, supported populist movements from the left and right on both sides of the Atlantic, exacerbating divisions within Western societies. And Putin's desire to push the United States to withdraw from Europe, and tearing up the transatlantic alliance would achieve his main goal, which is to get rid of the existing liberal international order in favor of a system similar to the one that existed in the nineteenth century, in which the world is divided into three spheres of influence, Led by Russia, China and the United States, each respect each other's spheres of influence³⁰.

The NATO Summit, which was held in June 2022 in Madrid, was a historic event by all accounts. In response to the Russian intervention in Ukraine and the broader aggression against Europe, NATO unveiled a new strong strategic concept, and invited Finland and Sweden to join the alliance. It is a historic moment for the two

traditionally neutral countries and a major statement of the Alliance's "open door" policy. However, the ambiguous fate of the two countries most suffering from Russian aggression looms large in both Ukraine and Georgia. The two countries were promised membership in the alliance during the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania. However, they are both still outside of it. Now, the massive human and material losses caused by Russia's genocidal and neo-imperialist war in Ukraine have put NATO's expanded and unfulfilled promises of comprehensive relief in indelible shame. Obscured by ambiguous technical aspects, it was clear that the alliance's failure to provide Ukraine and Georgia with a concrete path to membership was an unintended but predictable invitation to Russian attack³¹.

As Ukrainians desperately defend their homeland, the moral and strategic poverty of Ukraine's delayed accession is exposed. NATO and its members must now recognize the cost of a passive approach, and rethink the Alliance's founding purpose. The block was never intended to be a country club exclusively for the rich and powerful, but a harbor for the weak and vulnerable, and it should be again.

Last April, while observing the Hungarian parliamentary elections, I saw the catastrophic humanitarian crisis on Ukraine's borders with Hungary and Slovakia, I saw children who traveled long distances with their families, clutching small souvenirs of home, and I met Ukrainians who traveled back across the border, bringing supplies from the European Union into In western Ukrainian cities, I saw the humanity of volunteers offering a measure of relief and a welcome to the weary refugees who had finally reached safety on the border of the European Union. But what I didn't see were any major barriers or geographic edifices indicating the line where, on the one hand, NATO would risk nuclear war to defend its members, and, on the other, in Ukraine it wouldn't³².

In the United States and Europe, debates about the borders between NATO and the rest of the European continent are treated as geographically immutable traits as if they were destiny, and as if some nations and peoples were given a divine destiny to join the rare Euro-Atlantic team. Decisions in the run-up to the war for vital aid or security guarantees were often justified on the basis of Ukraine's non-membership of NATO, even though no concrete paths were provided for the alliance, despite the 2008 declaration. The notion that Ukraine and Georgia are unwilling or unable to meet NATO's technical standards has often been a problematic argument. At no time

did NATO set strict technical criteria for membership—clear and achievable criteria for entry—and doing so would have risked Ukraine and Georgia bypassing the crowd, potentially embarrassing countries that were emphatically opposed to their accession.

Realistically, NATO expansion has always been a political decision. More recent emphasis on technical and practical "readiness" has been introduced after the Cold War to amplify NATO's transformation from a Cold War bastion to a carrier of Euro-Atlantic values and to manage the booming demand in Eastern Europe for membership. But today, Moscow's threat to peace in Europe is once again all too clear — and devastatingly in Ukraine, as well as in Georgia. In response, NATO should change the strategic landscape when Ukraine and other threatening partners burn³³.

With aggressive expansion, NATO is generally seen as a walled garden - a sheltered bastion of relative peace, prosperity, and predictability. Yet this reputation belies the seismic strategic revolution that NATO's founding and early expansion strongly represented in the nuclear age and confronting Soviet expansion after two horrific continental wars in the first half of the twentieth century, as the United States sought to create structures to stop Europe's devastating cycles of Great Power War . Faced with the real danger of Soviet imperialism and a possible third world war, NATO created a protected haven around Europe's most threatened and poorest country³⁴.

"The determination of the free nations of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them," President Harry Truman said just one year before the founding of NATO. To create a rule-based paradise in modern Europe, the United States and its closest allies drew a line in the face of Soviet expansion, saying: No more. Despite the hardships of war and the arduous task of reconstruction, the founders of North Atlantic combined their military strength and political determination, as well as risking a Third World War in the defense of Europe.

The countries that joined the European Union were not all first-class military powers, economic dynamos, or stable democracies, many were politically unstable, militarily depleted, and economically fractured, and many, like Portugal and Spain, were military dictatorships. The main continental fighters of World War II -

Germany, France and Italy - were literally devastated by the war and took decades to recover.

However, the United States and other original NATO members did not argue endlessly about the fluctuations in the threatening partner's democratic credentials or its accommodation of various technical or military reforms. And they generally accepted the European countries that sought to protect Washington and its Western orientation. This was not due to Western indifference to democracy, but rather an acknowledgment that democratic transition under an imminent Soviet threat was fundamentally impossible, and that a country swallowed up by Moscow's imperial agenda had no chance of true self-determination - let alone democracy. Speaking of NATO's goal, the United States, then Secretary of State Dean Acheson, described the project as "designed to contribute to the stability and welfare of member states.

It took some time, but the strategy paid off. Under the nuclear umbrella of NATO and the United States, great-power warfare, the democratization and prosperity of Europe, and the dismantling of the Soviet Union and its colonial brand were avoided, liberating tens of millions of people. With Russia once again in the midst of authoritarianism and expansionist militarism, the conditions that accompanied the founding of NATO are all too familiar. Russian aggression in the heart of Europe is an indisputable fact – as the blood-soaked Ukrainian lands clearly attest – and there is no reason to believe or expect Moscow to stop even if it is not. NATO should meet the requirements of this moment. Reluctance about technicalities in peacetime challenges NATO's original purpose of securing Europe from the specter of Moscow's violent imperial agenda. This is not a return to the Cold War, but no less a civilized struggle against a military dictatorship in Moscow. This threat is especially clear and present to the millions of Ukrainians and Georgians who had no choice but to suffer on the wrong side of geopolitical train tracks³⁵.

NATO should go back to its roots and open its doors to those in Europe who are in danger of preying on Russia. How can this be done? NATO decisions, including membership, require consensus. The transition to an open-door wartime policy will require a major shift in thinking. On the one hand, the United States, as the ultimate guarantor of NATO's military strength, should take steps to provide robust security assistance and guarantees to threatening partners — such as those promises it made to Finland and Sweden until their full accession — and encourage other like-minded

allies to do the same. Likewise, NATO's dispute over outstanding territorial disputes - often created or supported by Moscow - should not be formally a problem. Russia should not be rewarded for cultivating and supporting violent separatist movements that shield mother countries from joining NATO. Russian interference and aggression demonstrate the need to protect NATO, which is simple in principle but, admittedly, difficult to take in politics amid a raging war³⁶.

First, the United States and its allies can all do more to ensure Ukraine's military dominance and win its war of independence. The ambiguous gaps undermining Western sanctions policies require attention, such as Europe's continued dependence on Russian energy, US imports of Russian steel, and the growing role of China and other nations. Others in the Middle East, Eurasia, and Asia (including friends and partners), to bypass or mitigate the impact of international trade sanctions.

Likewise, US reluctance to deliver heavy weapons and munitions to Ukraine must end. The delivery of US artillery and M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) platforms has completely changed the momentum of the conflict in recent weeks, and more long-range munitions and fast Western aircraft capabilities could help Ukraine expand the initiative against the highly militarily capable Russian attacking force³⁷.

Second, the United States could consider extending its nuclear umbrella over Ukraine to erase Russia's nuclear advantage and any temptation it might have to use nuclear weapons as Russian conventional losses mount. Doing so would only be a stronger and clearer statement of current US policy that Russia's use of weapons of mass destruction against Ukraine would be "completely unacceptable" and "with grave consequences," as US President Joe Biden has already said. Faced with such a horrific prospect, the West could be clearer about the obvious downsides of such a strategy, which would in itself violate Russian nuclear doctrine.

Third, the United States can and should have discussions about certain security guarantees for Ukraine's free zones, such as the provision of more advanced Western weapons or direct Western air defense coverage. For Georgia, and even for a country like Moldova if it so chooses, it is even more obvious to provide support and security guarantees over non-occupied areas³⁸.

Conclusion

The strategy before the Russian-Ukrainian war changed towards what happened in the reactions that coincided with the announcement of US President Biden that he was hearing the rumble of World War III, and Putin's entry into the center of Ukraine.. This has established a radical change in the situation in Europe, according to what President Macron recently said "Russia has given us a wake-up call. I've always thought we needed a degree of strategic clarity, and now we're getting it." Macron added that NATO had received an "electric shock" when Russia attacked Ukraine. Geopolitically and internationally, Europe can only be defended with the help of NATO, that is, with the American allies. This is why the EU's "strategic compass" is in no way competing with NATO.

The crisis between Ukraine and Russia points to multiple problems. The security and national dimensions are two main factors of the crisis, and the determinants of political geography are also strongly present. Therefore, a deeper understanding of the crisis is through what the realistic theory presents from the concepts of national interest, considerations of strength, expansion and the conflict relationship between states, which is What the research tried to address, for power is the driver of the crisis, and security, alliances, and expansion are key factors in explaining what is happening. Russia fears Ukraine's joining the European Union and NATO, and the strategic and security risks this poses to its interests, and even a threat to its security as perceived by Russian leaders, as well as the issue of The deployment of NATO missiles in the region and other issues that are related to the so-called higher interests of countries³⁹.

On the other hand, the Europeans are afraid of Russia and its expansion in the region, as well as America. Russia's occupation of Ukraine, if it happens, means a threat to the survival of other European countries as well, and these are concerns that preoccupy the Europeans, while Ukraine seeks to join NATO and the European Union in order to strengthen its strength and protect its national security, this implies that the borders of the European Union will become at the gates of Russia⁴⁰

The importance of how the European Union deals with Russia is mainly due to the fact that the previously discussed "strategic orientation" document dealt with it as a source of threat to European security in its internal dimension related to the security

of the European citizen, and in its external dimension related to the strategic interests of the Union in several regions of the world.

So, there are three alternatives to dealing with threatening states; The first is confrontation, the second alternative is coexistence, and the third alternative is cooperation. The alternative to entering the European Union into a confrontation with Russia with the aim of putting an end to its expansionist policies is not appropriate given the balance of power between the two sides. For example, the volume of military spending in Russia in 2020 amounted to 4.3% of GDP, while in the European Union it amounted to 1.6% of GDP at the level of the Union⁴¹.

In the field of energy, despite the Union imposing many economic sanctions on Russia, individual European countries are still seeking to obtain Russian energy sources in order to complete filling their reservoirs before the onset of winter. Thus, entering into this confrontation requires the European Union to act in coordination and cooperation with NATO, bearing in mind the strengthening of the Russian alliance with China as a response to that confrontation.

As for the alternative to coexistence, which is based on the idea of accepting Russia's expansionist tendencies within certain limits in exchange for Russia's observance of European security requirements, the experience of the Russian intervention in Crimea in 2014 and then the announcement of its annexation of Russia without any European move was a prelude to the repetition of Russia's expansionist policies, as Expressed by the current war in Ukraine, and this indicates that confidence-building measures and exchange of views between Russia and European countries, which were taking place in frameworks independent of the European Union, such as the framework of the NATO-Russia Council and the Council of Europe on human rights on the continent, of which Russia is a member, and within the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, it has led to the consolidation of Russia's knowledge of the shortcomings of European security arrangements and thus the appreciation of the maximum action that the European Union can take in the face of any Russian action in Ukraine.

As for the alternative to cooperation, it means the direction of the European Union to create an innovative mechanism for discussion and negotiation with Russia on what is common, such as Russian energy exports, and to reconsider plans to include

some Eastern European countries in the European Union, with the aim of building on what is common to develop a European-Russian security culture. Establishing security cooperation in the future.

This alternative may be the most attractive for Russia, because on the one hand it guarantees the continuation of its economic interests with Europe in the field of energy and paves the way for the abolition of the economic sanctions that have been imposed on it, and on the other hand it allows it to achieve its own demands to stop the expansion of the European Union to the east in exchange for security cooperation with the Union in security fields. Particular joint efforts, such as arms control, armament reduction, and addressing Ukrainian organized crime networks that take advantage of war conditions to move across borders and cross-border arms smuggling and foreign fighters⁴².

The foregoing shows that the Russian-Ukrainian war has prompted the European Union to reconsider the priority threats and risks and the nature of the policies to be adopted at the Union level, and in the relationship with neighboring countries, which paves the way for a qualitative shift in European security arrangements that we may see in the coming years.

Despite the difficulty of determining the dimensions of this paradigm shift, which will continue to be formed in light of the developments of the Russian-Ukrainian war, it is expected to provide specific answers about the nature of Russia's role in European security arrangements, and the relationship of those arrangements to NATO, as well as the development of a pragmatic framework for security relations between countries. Union and neighboring countries.

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