The Red Sea Region Security ..... Different Visions

أمن منطقة البحر الأحمر .. رؤى مختلفة

دلال محمود السيد
دكتوراه - مدرس بكلية الاقتصاد والعلوم السياسية - جامعة القاهرة

Abstract:

The Red Sea region has a strategic importance stemming from the importance of the shipping lane itself and the interests of many regional and international powers in it (United states of America, Russia, China, Gulf states, Iran, Israel and Egypt). There is an absence of a stable security system in it, and this increases the impact of the different interests and different visions of these forces, as countries are keen on not having a security system that negatively affects their interests. These conflicting visions may reshape alliances among some countries, thus affecting the future balance of power in this region. The African horn's developments and the other variables related with the gulf states, Iranian crisis and terrorist groups cause the instability on Red Sea region. With the liquidity situation in the region and the lack of clarity of the balance of power in it, the security of the Red Sea region as a strategic navigation corridor remains subject to several considerations.

المستخلص:

تتمتع منطقة البحر الأحمر بأهمية إستراتيجية نابعة من أهمية الخط الملاحي نفسه ومصالح العديد من القوى الإقليمية والدولية فيه (الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، وروسيا، الصين، دول الخليج، إيران، وإسرائيل، ومصر). هناك غياب لنظام أمني مستقر فيه، وهذا يزيد من تأثير المصالح المختلفة والرؤى المختلفة لهذه القوات، حيث تحرص الدول على عدم وجود نظام أمني يؤثر سلبا على مصالحها. قد تعيد هذه الرؤى المتضاربة تشكيل التحالفات بين بعض البلدان، مما يؤثر على توازن القوى المستقبلي في هذه المنطقة. تسبب تطورات القرن الأفريقي والمتغيرات الأخرى المتعلقة بدول الخليج والأزمة الإيرانية والجماعات الإرهابية في زعزعة الاستقرار في منطقة البحر الأحمر. مع وضع السبولة في
Introduction:

The Red Sea is strategically located in the heart of a geographical circle that possesses distinguished natural features, and combines the Nile Basin with the Horn of Africa to the west, the Arabian Gulf with its oil sources to the east, the Indian Ocean and East Africa to the south, and the Mediterranean to the north. This importance has made it one of the most important world’s maritime routes, where the Red sea acquires Extreme Importance; Because it is one of the most important maritime routes in the world where it provides the regional and international powers access to the Mediterranean sea and the open oceans, and through which more than half of the world's oil is transferred, giving the subject of the Red Sea security a priority in global strategic thinking and in the interest of major states in the era Different historical.

By the end of the Cold War in 1991/92, the United States worked hard to find stable bases for security in the Arab region accepted by its main powers as the guarantor of these rules. This created a relative stability of the security of the Red Sea. the work of the agenda of many international and regional powers, which imposes many questions about the reasons for the escalation of concern for the security of the Red Sea, the most important suggested approaches put forward for achieving this security from different parties, and this calls into question what the Arab countries must be doing to secure the Red Sea.

First: The reasons for the increased interest to the security of the Red Sea:

During the current period, there have been many reasons that have rekindled global interest in the issue of the security of the Red Sea and the most appropriate arrangements for achieving it

1- Increasing the intense of threats emanating from the countries surrounding the Red Sea, which could affect the freedom of global navigation in it, In addition to the acts of piracy emanating from Somalia years ago, there is an internal armed conflict - internationalized - raging in Yemen on the south-eastern bank of the Red Sea and internal political conflict in Djibouti on the South West Bank of the Red Sea. Active in its north between the Gulf of Aqaba
and Suez, not to mention the worsening situation in Eritrea and Sudan. If the narrow circle of the Red Sea itself widens, the scene of a civil war in Syria and another internal conflict in Iraq will not widen. A political rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia amounts to the struggle for influence. The Red Sea has its place in Iran's regional project in the Arab region, Shiite Crescent.

2- There are new discoveries of gas in the Red Sea Since 2012 Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Saudi Aramco) has announced the discovery of a new gas field in the north of the submerged area of the Red Sea, 26 kilometers north-west of the port of Daba. In the face of Tabuk and in the area facing the Egyptian city of Hurghada. This is perhaps the reason for the demarcation of the maritime border between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, but it is clear that these discoveries are not far from the interest of the big powers, especially the United States and China.

3- International and regional players are aware of the importance of the Red Sea, and therefore they are keen to establish their strength in one way or another in this or that of the countries concerned. The strategies of some of these players have been shown and implemented with strong policies and timetables. This is aided by the Arab neglect of Africa and the Horn of Africa In particular, despite the fact that it represents a strategic depth to the Arab countries. The United States and France are among the most important international forces interested in the security of the Red Sea, as will be explained later. The most important regional powers are Iran and Israel. For Iran, which is keen to be present in the Horn of Africa and its policies towards the Red sea are diverse, but it is noted that the entry of Gulf States to compete with Iranian influence there has relatively reduced the chances of Iran in this region. Israel has quickly strengthened its presence in Eritrea, established its own military base at the port of Massawa and benefited from the Eritrean islands along its Red Sea coast of more than 1,000 km, which includes more than 360 islands. One of the most important of these bases is the base of Marwa and Mahawalawi on the Sudan border, while ensuring the establishment of air bases on the island of Haleb and the island of Fatima at the Bab al-Mandab Strait, in addition to renting Dahlak Island, where Tel Aviv has established a naval base. Israel is investing in the geostrategic importance of these islands, which gives it the advantage of influencing the international and regional balance of the sea to monitor the movements of ships and navigation and to control the prevention of any Arab country from imposing a naval blockade.
on Israel under any circumstances. The following map shows the most important islands in the Red Sea.

![Map of the Red Sea islands](image)

4- The US strategy towards the Middle East during the administration of former President Barack Obama has resulted in a relative decline in its position and perhaps prestige of the United States in the region, regardless of the reality of the US goals in this strategy or assessing their success in achieving these goals, it is considered an exit From an American administration out of Carter's established principle since the late 1970s. It is certain that there is a strategic gap in determining who is responsible for maintaining the security arrangements that prevailed in the Middle East. This resulted in the encouragement of some international powers (China and Japan) or the regional powers (Israel, Iran, the Gulf states and, to a lesser extent, recently paid attention to Somalia, not to the countries of the Red Sea) to expand their influence in the Horn of Africa.

5- There is a direct reflection on Egypt linked to the security of the Red Sea in two dimensions. The first is the density of foreign direct presence from regional and international forces in both Djibouti and Eritrea. This presence, reinforced by military bases, thousands of soldiers and an arsenal of weapons, which could threaten Egypt's southern depth Security and politically and constitutes a relative restriction on the freedom of movement of Egypt to secure the Red Sea. Second: Egyptian security efforts to combat the terrorist organizations in the Sinai are exploited by some anti-regime forces to promote the possibility that the navigation of the Suez Canal will be affected by these efforts to harm the media at least.

**Second: The most important approaches suggested to achieve the security of the Red Sea:**
It is clear from the previous reasons that international and regional interest to the security of the Red Sea has increased. This concern has been reflected in the presentation of some visions or perceptions of how to achieve this security. Needless to say, these visions are concerned with the interests of the countries that urged them most. The most important of these visions were presented by the United States of America, China and Israel. It may therefore be appropriate to refer to the fundamental interests of the parties involved in the issue of the security of the Red Sea: the five Arab States of the Horn of Africa and Israel.

**Arab States**: The interests of the six Arab countries (Jordan, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen and Saudi Arabia) are linked to ensuring territorial control over the Red Sea and maintaining full and effective sovereign rights in the management of its territorial waters. On the other hand, guarantee free shipping in the Red Sea in general and in the Suez Canal in particular, and secure the transfer of oil supplies from the Arabian Gulf to world markets. These Arab interests were clearly confirmed in the Arab alliance in Yemen. The naval operations were aimed at preventing military supplies that could reach the Houthis from Iran. Because the objective here was clear, coordination between the participating countries was based on clear security measures. At first, the efforts of the naval blockade focused on Aden until it was liberated and then moved to the ports of Al-Mukha and Hodeidah, which are the main receiving points for transporting Iranian weapons through the Horn of Africa. Coalition forces prevented commercial and civilian vessels from reaching these ports, while other forces regularly patrolled the area to stop and search suspicious ships. Only vessels with valid Coalition authorization were allowed access to the ports under the embargo. A large number of naval vessels were deployed to support this process, including Benigna cruisers from the United Arab Emirates, at least one Olivier Hazard Piri frigate from Egypt and the Saudi support and supply vessel Yanbu, which enabled the fleet of offshore work for longer periods. The United States and other Western countries have also strengthened their maritime presence in the region, not only to guard freight corridors, but also to intercept arms smugglers.

**The two states of the Horn of Africa (Djibouti and Eritrea)**: Despite the Arabism of these two countries implicitly, Djibouti is linked to its basic interests other than the Arab countries, and Eritrea has moved away from its Arab identity since it gained independence in 1993.
them are the strategic location at the entrance to the Red Sea And they suffer from high rates of poverty and unemployment; therefore, their main dependence on promoting the importance of the site either by allowing the leasing of land or islands to international and regional powers used as military bases and security focal points for these countries. In Djibouti, there is a French base - the largest of the three French bases in Africa - and a US, Japanese and European base - to support the fight against piracy - and a Chinese base under establishment called by China a "security point" for Chinese merchant ships crossing the Red Sea. The officials' statements of Djibouti declare agreement between their state and Saudi Arabia to establish a military base in Djibouti. Eritrea has Israeli and Iranian bases - previously explained - in addition to an Emirati base.

**Israel:** The Israeli strategic thought of the Red Sea was of pre-state nature and the founding fathers tried to confer it as part of the kingdom of Solomon. Peace be upon him, David Ben-Gurion expressed this importance clearly: "Israel's control of points or positions in the Red sea is of utmost importance, because these points will help Israel to stop any attempts to besiege and encircle them, and will form a base of military launch to attack our enemies in their home, before they start to attack us. Since then, Israel has clear strategic objectives in the Red Sea, the most important of which are:

1- Securing the Israeli maritime navigation through the protection of the port of Eilat and the right of passage in the Strait of Tiran, Bab El Mandeb and the Suez Canal, and the military concentration in some Red Sea islands for surveillance and as a base of operations, which requires strengthening relations and cooperation with some African countries.

2- Internationalization of Bab al-Mandab as an international traffic corridor, in the sense of preventing Arab states from controlling it, as well as preventing any projects of Arab cooperation for the security of the Red Sea.

3- Force the Presence of Israel as a regional power in the Red Sea, and this aim became as a motivation for Israel relations with the Gulf states in the last two years.

Therefore, the interests of the riparian states on the Red Sea are witnessing a degree of conflict and disagreement and perhaps the contradiction between the five Arab countries and Israel. The interests of The Horn of Africa
countries are local, not regional, and their interests are aligned with the most powerful and influence forces. These interests must be understood when discussing the proposed visions for a security regime that governs the security of the Red Sea.

Israel aims to internationalize the issue of securing the Red Sea as an international water corridor that should remain open to the ships of all countries, including Israel, and that the Arabs have no right to control it or restrict the freedom of navigation of any country in it. This is linked to the formation of international forces from the riparian states on the Red Sea to secure it, so that the Arab countries with the longest coasts east of the sea and the West will not be able to perform this task which could form potential threat to Israel and the policies that have already been mentioned for this purpose.

In view of these proposals, several things are noted:

1- There is a similarity between the goal of the American and Israeli proposal to internationalize the security of the Red Sea to achieve their common interests in the Red Sea, and these are contrary to the interests of the Arab countries while imposing the largest burden of implementation of this proposal on the shoulders of the Arab countries.

2- The Chinese proposal did not care to involve the Arab countries in achieving the desired balance of power as a basis for the security regime of the Red Sea. Therefore, the main objective is to safeguard China's interests with its own capabilities at no additional cost.

3- The other major countries, Russia, Japan or the European countries are not far from the issue of the security of the Red Sea. Russia, with its current pragmatic policy and limited economic capabilities, deliberately sets priorities in the region and what interests it in the security of the Red Sea is not allowing the success of the united states to use it to Europe as an alternative to Russian gas through Israel or Jordan or other allied countries of the United States, which led the United States to think that the Chinese presence in Djibouti is the cover of Russia or the lowest estimates of cooperation between them. Japan already has a military base in Djibouti, a traditional ally of the United States, which can participate or take advantage of any security system the United States has. Similarly, European countries that have an effective military presence to combat piracy can develop their missions beyond Somali coasts if necessary.
4- There is no single or integrated Arab vision to secure the Red Sea, despite its importance. Sources suggest that during the late 1970s, the Arab League proposed a joint force to counter any potential threats to the security of the Red Sea, but did not form. Despite the Egyptian proposal in 2015 to form a joint Arab force to confront regional threats, it did not mention the security of the Red Sea, nor did it!

**American Vision:** There are several strategic American interests in the Red Sea, the most important of which are: preventing the influence of any international or regional force in the Red Sea, ensuring Israel's security, and ensuring the flow of oil through the Red Sea. This is related to securing energy supplies to allies in Europe away from dependence on Russian gas. After the relative gap resulting from the disappearance of the stable American security system in the region, which has mentioned many times in American thought centers since the end of Obama's term, and proposed by Trump's administration which presented its vision of a coherent strategy in the Middle East that brings the United States back the greatest influence in the Middle East the idea of establishing an organization for the alliance of "The Gulf and the Red Sea", along the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, include a number of founding countries: Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United States of America. The aim of this alliance is to preserve the nation state system and the rule of law after the transformation of a number of countries in the region into failed states, thus maintaining the political stability in the region which is threatened by extremist Islamic movements.

Therefore, the main objective is to eliminate the terrorist organizations active in the region, in a way that ends the regional conflict in this area (184). The alliance is based on members' own forces from their countries, and the role of the United States is to provide them with logistical intelligence, and perhaps the participation of Special Forces without ground intervention. Israel has an indirect role in this alliance not to provoke the Arab countries but has a key role in this American perception of intelligence and possibly technological cooperation with Arab countries to achieve the goal of this alliance, which will be responsible for imposing and ensuring the security of the region (Gulf and Red Sea). It is important to note that Israel is not absent from this American perception, but has an important role to play in it, as it is not far from the security threats facing the region.

The United States considers that the common interests between Israel and the Arab countries in this proposition (Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia) is bigger than all conflicted issues among them, the threat posed by the terrorist
organizations may be transferred to Israel from the neighboring countries directly, which leads to intelligence cooperation with them. There are also interests that are gathered by the Sunni countries in the region to resist the increasing Iranian presence and influence in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.

The Trump administration has shown a clear interest in the Gulf region, especially after the sanctions imposed on Iran since last year and the resulting crisis, which caused various repercussions for the security of the entire Gulf region and its maritime corridors. Although the naval force that was formed with an American command to protect navigation in the Persian Gulf, there is an opportunity to extend the work of this force in the Red Sea if it threatens navigation in it\(^{(185)}\).

Baiden’s administration may be have the same attitude towards the Red Sea region, as the United States tries to activate a new strategy in Middle East, but it has different policies either towards the Arab States or Iran.

The United States emphasizes Israel’s importance in the security of the Red Sea - as the most important part of the US strategy in the Middle East - as it is a strong technological, intelligence and military state and can be an added force in this alliance. But the United States recognizes that it is difficult for Arab states to accept Israel in this alliance - at least in its early stages, whatever the common interests - without progress in the settlement of Israeli-Palestinian track. The US administration has taken serious steps to implement this proposal, and perhaps Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia and the Arab-American Islamic Summit in May 2017 and then his visit to Israel clearly reflect these steps.

**Chinese Existence:** China does not offer a clear vision like the US, but China is working to consolidate its influence in the Horn of Africa, specifically in Djibouti, relying on its hard power (mainly economically and militarily) through Chinese loans in billions, building strategic alliances with its government, in addition to deploying 2400 elite troops working on peacekeeping missions in Africa. China is using its naval units in the Gulf of Aden to secure its 6,000 maritime trade convoys each year, as well as a military base - a security support point adjacent to the US base, The only one in the Horn of Africa is Kamp Luminier.

The Chinese interests varies in this region, such as securing its oil supplies from Africa and the Gulf, expanding its economic influence on the African continent through its eastern entrance, especially the Silk Road and maritime Silk Road, that connects 60 countries across Asia, Africa and Europe, compete against the US presence in this important strategic region, undermining US opportunities for dominance and influence in the Middle
East as an extension of their strategic rivalry in the South China Sea region\(^{(186)}\).

The Chinese proposal did not explicitly present proposals for securing the Red Sea, but it is implicit in China's work to achieve a balance of power in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, especially with China's interest in energy projects with some regional powers such as Iran, not to mention 50% of its oil wealth from the Gulf. Although Saudi Arabia is a major and important resource for China's oil needs, China's strategic calculations are based on the fact that any severe crisis between China and the United States could make Saudi Arabia a closer ally to the United States, contrary to the situation with Iran in the strategic alliance, which supplies energy to China in exchange for military technology sought by Iran.

Third: the securities challenges in the Red Sea Region:

There are a number of challenges that could affect the security of navigation in the Red Sea, which can be summarized as follows\(^{(187)}\):

1. **International and regional competition**, the Red Sea region is witnessing a growing and increasing international and regional competition, as each country seeks to find a foothold in the region according to a number of moves and arrangements, especially with regard to the process of establishing military bases, as there are about 6 military bases around the Red Sea, and therefore we can standing on the nature of the competition between the United States of America and China in this region among the threats to stability, as America views Chinese influence, especially in the Horn of Africa, as a threat to US strategic interests.

At the same time Russia seeks to enhance its influence through more engagement in agreements with some countries of the Horn of Africa - Somalia and Ethiopia – and lately in Sudan, especially with regard to mutual defense agreements and obtaining naval and air facilities in that region, in addition to the Israeli role in the region, not to mention Iranian interference and influence, whether in support of the Houthis in Yemen or through its growing influence in the Horn of Africa countries, and Turkish efforts in Enhancing its presence in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean region, whether through military or economic presence.

Regional competition has arisen over the past years a state of regional statues among the countries of the region over influence in the Red Sea region, especially with the policy of axes and polarizations that dominate
the Middle East. Turkish attempts to strengthen influence in the Red Sea region will continue and may use this presence as a bargaining chip on other issues in the region, such as the Eastern Mediterranean energy file and the Libyan conflict.

In this context, Somalia will remain an important axis of Qatari and Turkish influence, as the two countries have sought to strengthen their alliance with the central government in Mogadishu, and Turkey is trying to consolidate its influence there through investments. Last October, the Turkish port operator Company (Al-Bayrak) signed an operating contract for the port with the Somali federal government, which gave the company a new 14-year concession to manage the port of Mogadishu, which has been operated by the company since 2014. Over the past years, The Turkish company Fafouri has also played an important role in the development and modernization of Mogadishu International Airport.

Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have also sought to assert their influence in the region, a trend that will continue through the next period. Egypt will continue the process of intensive diplomatic openness to the Red Sea countries as an important strategic area for Egyptian policy, and the Egyptian openness to these countries gives Cairo more paperwork in negotiating with Ethiopia on the issue of the Renaissance Dam. For its part, Saudi Arabia will strengthen its influence in the region to block Tehran, confront the Houthi group, and try to reduce the group's use of the Red Sea as a arena for its activity and attacks against Saudi targets. The same is true for the Principality, which has a significant presence in the Horn of Africa region, and is linked by agreements with a number of parties, such as agreements to build and operate military bases in Assab, Eritrea, Berbera, Somaliland, and the development of commercial ports in Berbera (Somaliland) and Bosaso (Puntland region, Somalia).

2. The emergence of non-state actors, this pattern represents a major threat to the security of the Red Sea, especially with regard to the Houthi group, as it is expected that the group will brandish the threat to navigation in the Gulf region and Bab al-Mandab as part of the Iranian strategy aimed at controlling trade and water corridors in the world, especially what is pursued. Tehran has always used this card and used it to a large extent in the Gulf crisis, and therefore it is expected that the Houthis will continue to threaten navigation in the Gulf region, and the calm remains dependent on the international and regional position on Iran, and we can rely on the Houthi’s arrest in November 2019, of three ships in the Red Sea as an indicator of what it could play. This group acts
as a proxy for Tehran in the region regarding the threat to navigation in the Red Sea and the Gulf.

The influence of violent non-state actors in the Red Sea region is likely to continue, and may increase in the future, not just the continuing Yemeni conflict, but the structural crises in the states of the region, such as Somalia, which have led to the increased influence of terrorist organizations.

In the final months of 2020, the group appeared to be on the move to increase its naval attacks. In November 2020, the Alliance for The Support of Legitimacy announced that a merchant ship in the Saudi Red Sea port of Al-Sa'aa was damaged while thwarting a terrorist attack by the Houthis. The same month, the coalition announced the removal and destruction of sea mines planted by the Houthi group in the southern Red Sea, and on December 9, 2020, the coalition announced the interception and destruction of two booby-trapped boats in the southern Red Sea launched by the Houthi group. Although the Houthi group has not claimed responsibility for the December 14th attack against a fuel-transporting vessel near the Saudi port of Jeddah using a booby-trapped boat. Most indicators, however, reveal the group's involvement in the attack.

Houthi maritime threats are likely to increase, particularly with growing talk of Washington seeking to classify the Houthi group as a terrorist organization. The group will therefore attempt to send messages through its naval attacks that classifying it as a terrorist group will not calm the conflict, but may further complicate it.

3. The threat of terrorist organizations in the Red Sea remains one of the challenges. Terrorist organizations, such as al-Shabaab, view the Red Sea as an important source of activity, both at the level of attacks through which the presence of the terrorist organization can be confirmed, or even at the level of the transfer of terrorist elements, and organizational funding.

Terrorist activity linked to the Red Sea is likely to be strengthened in the coming period, first, by the tensions in the region, both in Yemen and in the Horn of Africa, as Ethiopia is experiencing a severe internal crisis, the situation in Somalia remains unstable, not to mention the recent tensions in Somali-Kenyan relations and the Announcement of Mogadishu on December 15, 2020, to cut diplomatic relations with Kenya under the pretext that Nairobi is interfering in the internal affairs of The Al-Aal. The second consideration is linked to the development of the activities of
terrorist organizations over the past years, and cooperation with organized crime groups that use waterways in their activities (188).

4. **Consensus on the goal and disparity over the mechanisms "duplication of efforts"**. The protection of navigation and the security of the Red Sea and the Gulf remains a basic goal for all international and regional actors. However, there is a clear difference in the protection mechanisms, and this has emerged during the year 2019, when the United States presented its vision on the launch of an international alliance of a military nature to enhance the security of navigation (9 July 2019), at the same time Moscow offered an initiative for collective security in the Gulf region (23 July 2019), and a number of European countries believed that they could protect their naval ships in the Gulf without entering into specific alliances. Accordingly, it is expected that this disparity over mechanisms and means of protection will continue in the coming year, especially since each party will seek to impose its vision, which makes the formulation and launch of a vision that everyone agrees on complex and subject to intertwining calculations.

**Fourth: How to preserve the security of the Red Sea:**

A stable security system in the Gulf and the Red Sea, or at least specific security arrangements, is necessary, not a political luxury. This is what must be realized and what must be done. This prompted the Egyptian decision maker to work on two levels:

**National level:** Following measures to address the immediate security threats to Egypt associated with the Red Sea, such as:

1- Securing navigation in the Suez Canal starting from Bab al-Mandab and not only from the Egyptian territories. This requires increasing the naval armament and updating it qualitatively, adding to the Egyptian combats more capability (189). Egypt has carried out a number of arms deals for this purpose. The most prominent of these deals are: the Mistral Amphibious attack ship "BPC-210" with high technical capabilities in combat and reconnaissance missions as well as air operations can be classified as helicopter carriers; 16 heavy helicopters or 35 light helicopters in a storage space directly below the deck, as well as German submarines of the model 209/1400 with high combat capability, as well as a number of armored franks with SSM missiles and anti-submarine submarines (190).
It is important to recognize that the modernization and development of the Egyptian navy has been in response to the priorities of the Egyptian threats, which necessitate securing the Egyptian coasts both in the north and in the east. On the other hand, there is a relative change in the Egyptian maritime doctrine, which is reflected in the high offensive capabilities of the Egyptian Navy to achieve balance and perhaps mutual deterrence with the Israeli naval force as the most developed relatively in the region. As a result of this Egyptian trend, the Egyptian navy moved to a higher rank in the maritime military classification - the sixth ranking in the world according to the classification of Global Fire - to be able to operate within the coast of the Republic and in the seas and oceans that fall in the regional border after it was previously classified as a navy capable of operating freely within the "rivers and coasts" just like most of the naval weapons in the Middle East and Africa. And the launch of the Southern Fleet and its command in the Red Sea. All opinions agree to consider these Egyptian steps aims to deter the forces located in the Red Sea to harm the interests of Egypt, and declare Egypt's seriousness in asserting its maritime influence in it and it is a regional party in any major security arrangements for the Red Sea.191.

2- Increasing the relative importance of the Suez Canal axis in order to face the allegations of weak Egyptian ability to secure the Canal or to face competing projects such as the Canal of Bahrain project between Israel and Jordan, despite technical and political difficulties facing its implementation. This was one of the reasons for drilling the second Suez Canal for the 2014/2015 period, as well as for deepening the canal's subspecies.

3- To strengthen the Egyptian presence in the Horn of Africa. Some Eritrean officials have stated that there is a possibility of establishing an Egyptian base in the future and possibly entering into joint activities with the UAE or Saudi Arabia in the military bases they have leased in Djibouti and Eritrea, Economic development of the two countries in the Horn of Africa.

4- Strengthening relations with the Sudan, which is witnessing strong US efforts to acquire a military base instead of the base in Djibouti or in addition to it, and this does not mean Egypt's competition to the United States there as much as it means that Egypt is present in all countries related to the security of the Red Sea.

Regional level: This means co-ordination between the five Arab countries that have already been mentioned previously to strengthen the Arab regional
control over the Red Sea. This coordination is mainly in the area of information and joint naval maneuvers between them or between friendly forces in the Red Sea to raise the level of efficiency and readiness of the forces to confront possible threats. There is an interest in offering an Arab project or vision to secure the Red Sea to take into consideration the interests of the rest of the riparian states. This is not excluded as there is a relative success of the objectives of the Arab operations of the Arab alliance in Yemen to prevent the Houthis and the forces of Abdullah Saleh from controlling bay of Aden or take advantage of the Iranian Red Sea supplies to them, not only this, but also that US efforts to join them in maritime surveillance work to achieve the objective, then the agreement on the target is the way to find an acceptable perception of the security of the Red Sea.

The Arab vision crystallized in establishing the Council of Arab and African States bordering the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, which includes Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Djibouti, Yemen, Somalia and Eritrea. It aims to develop mutual cooperation between them and enhance security and stability in the region, through coordination and consultation on the vital waterway, which represents economic, commercial and investment importance for the entire global economy (192).

However, there are obstacles to this Arab project related with the objectives of the countries that are active in the issue of the security of the Red Sea; the most important of them are the following:

1- Djibouti and Eritrea, because they constitute a real obstacle to any Arab perception of the security of the Red Sea by their reluctance to accept the intensive foreign presence on their land. This requires that their interests be more closely related to Arab states than other regional and perhaps international powers. Their interests are essentially economic, and therefore Arab investment in them, especially in infrastructure projects, may be an appropriate input to this desired link. Although there is Arabian efforts to create an organization to secure the Red Sea area named “Arab Countries Council for The Security of Red Sea and Aden Bay”, these efforts still in its beginning (193).

2- The interest of the Gulf - the most Arab parties economic capacity - the military presence in the Horn of Africa coincided with the continuation of military operations of the Arab alliance in Yemen to tighten control of Bab al - Mandab and the Gulf of Aden, especially with the rapid decisiveness of these operations as was supposed, and here the question arises: What if the situation in Yemen stabilizes in proportion to the Gulf targets, will the interest in the security of the Red Sea, specifically the Horn of Africa, remain in front of the decline?
3- The differences between the priorities and responsibilities of the states of this council may represent an impediment to coordination and joint cooperation, or when it becomes a functioning institutional mechanism.

4- The absence of some influential countries in the Red Sea region, such as Ethiopia and Israel, is a potential obstacle to this Arab project.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, the protection of security in the Red Sea remains dependent on the extent to which a number of regional conflicts that affect the security of navigation, especially the conflict in Yemen, are calmed down, as well as the competitive situation in the Horn of Africa, where international and regional interests intersect, and the upcoming US elections may result in a change in The administration or a change in Trump's priorities if he continues regarding the unification of international and regional efforts to protect maritime navigation, while easing the pressure on Iran and the international position on Tehran determines what the security of navigation in the Red Sea and the Gulf in general can be, so more pressure means more threat For navigation traffic by Iran and its proxies in the region

What must be emphasized is that there is no clear security system to achieve the security of the Red Sea region, which provided an opportunity for the emergence of many conflicting interests between countries. With the liquidity situation in the region and the lack of clarity of the balance of power in it, the security of the Red Sea region as a strategic navigation corridor remains subject to several considerations. First, the regional security arrangements projects differ between the American and Arab project. Second, the relative difference of American policies and the extent of their actual involvement in the Gulf region and the Middle East in general. Third, the Yemeni conflict continues without achieving settlement or stability there. Fourth, the limits of Chinese economic and strategic interests in the region and their dependence on being in the Red Sea region. Finally, the expansion of terrorism in the Red Sea, as ISIS's transition to Yemen looks at more terrorist activity and, consequently, more international interventions to combat it.

References:


&http://www.defensenews.com/articles/us-beefing-up-red-sea-presence

( Dalal Mahmoud, “the future of the maritime security in the region”, 2020 Expectations, Cairo: ECSS, April 2020.


( http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/Egypt20160103.pdf and


( For more information :

(https://aawsat.com/home/article/2069676/%D8%A5%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%AC-%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%86
